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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
;

000O000

VICKIE BURROW,
Plaintiff ar*d
Appellant,
Case No. 88-0098CA
vs.
MARK VRONTIKIS,
Defendant and
Respondent.
000O000

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide the
appeal of this case pursuant to the provisions of Section
78-2(a)-3(2)(g), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
This appeal is from the Order of Judge J. Dennis Frederick
dated January 5, 1988, setting aside a Judgment in favor of the
plaintiff previously entered by Judge Frederick on September 18,
1984.

Judge Frederick ruled that the plaintiff's claim for back

support in a paternity action was barred by the doctrine of laches
and/or equitable estoppel (Copies of the Order and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law are included herein in the addendum.).
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPEAL
1.

Whether the equitable doctrines of laches and/or

equitable estoppel apply to the facts of this case.
2.

Whether the holding in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144

(Utah 1987) is applicable to this case.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- STATUTES, RULES AND CASES
1.

Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a-l, et, seq. , Utah Code

Annotated (1953 as amended) (A copy of the Act is included herein in
the addendum*).
2.

Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) (A copy of

this case is included herein in the addendum.).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

This is a paternity action brought by plaintiff against

defendant pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity, Section
78-45a=l, et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
2.

(R. 2-5)

Judgment was entered in the Third Judicial District

Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on September 18, 1984.
The Judgment declared the defendant Mark Vrontikis to be the natural
father of Chad Laverne Harney, son of the plaintiff Vickie Burrow.
The Judgment also awarded the plaintiff a Judgment against the
defendant in the sum of $7,200.00, representing back child support
from June 1, 1979 through May 31, 1983, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 78-45a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended). (R. 165-167)
3.

In entering the Judgment, the Third District Court ruled

that it was bound by the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in the
case of Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978), that the equitable
doctrine of laches was not applicable in a statutory action.
171)

(R.

That ruling was subsequently overruled by the Utah Supreme

-2-
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Court in the case of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987).
(R. 249)
4.

The defendant appealed the decision of the Third

District Court to the Utah Supreme Court.

(R. 172)

The Utah

Supreme Court thereafter transferred this case to the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to the provisions of 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended).

([Missing from Record])

The Utah Court of

Appeals subsequently reversed and remanded the Judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court on the basis of the Utah Supreme Court's
ruling in Borland/ supra. (R. 247-251)

The Third District Court

thereafter held an evidentiary hearing concerning the issue of
whether the doctrine of laches applied to the facts of this case and
thereafter entered its Findings of Fact and Order that the doctrine
of laches barred plaintiff's claim for back child support.
253-258)

Plaintiff thereafter filed this appeal.

(R.

(R. 259)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff is the natural mother of a minor son Chad

Laverne Harney, born August 17, 1976.
2.

Defendant is the natural father of plaintiff's child

Chad Laverne Harney.
3.

(R. 179)

(R. 177-178)

When plaintiff informed defendant that she was pregnant

in March 1976, he indicated that he was not able to make any
committment to her.
4.

(R. 180, 270, T. 20)

There was no further direct contact between the

plaintiff and defendant prior to the filing of this action.
214, T. 21)
-3-
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(R 181,

5.

Plaintiff never made any direct representations to

defendant concerning his obligations or her intentions.
6.

(T. 8, 9)

Plaintiff never requested any third party to relay any

representations to defendant concerning his obligations or her
intentions,

(T. 25, 26, 31, 32)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The equitable doctrines of laches and/or equitable

estoppel are not applicable to the facts of this case.

For these

doctrines to apply requires some affirmative action on the part of
the plaintiff more than mere silence.

There is no evidence in the

record to support the trial court's holding that there was more than
mere silence.
2.

The trial court misapplied the holding in Borland v.

Chandler, in that it deals with Section 78-45a-2 and not Section
78-45a-3, Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended).

In Borland, the

Utah Supreme Court discussed the possible prejudice to the defendant
of plaintiff's delay in terms concerning defendant's ability to
defend himself at trial.

In the instant case, no assertion was made

nor could one have been made that the defendant was prejudiced at
trial by plaintiff's delay in bringing this action, because the
defendant stipulated to the issue of paternity at trial.

Section

78-45a-3 clearly is intended to protect persons in the position of
the defendant by limiting the father's liability to a period of four
years.
/

•i
.....,

.

.

;.,.

-4-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF LACHES AND/OR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
While the Utah Supreme Court has clearly ruled in the case
of Borland v. Chandler, supra, that the equitable doctrines of
laches and/or equitable estoppel can apply to a statutory paternity
action.

The doctrines are simply not applicable to the facts of

this case.

In the evidentiary hearing heard before Judge Frederick

on December 7, 1987, both the plaintiff and defendant testified that
no representations were made by the plaintiff to the defendant.

The

plaintiff testified that she did not make any agreements or promises
to the defendant.

(T. 7)

The defendant testified that the

plaintiff made no committment to him.

(T. 20, 21)

The defendant

further testified that he knew the plaintiff did not want a third
party to tell him anything.

He testified as follows:

"As a matter

of fact, she did not even want him to tell me - - at one time I was
with Bill and I could tell that he had some information that he so
badly wanted to tell me, yet he was asked not to . . ."

The third

party, William Robert Snape, Jr., testified that the plaintiff did
not ask him to relay any information or message to the defendant.
(T. 35)
In the case of Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979), the
Utah Supreme Court dealt with the issue of laches in a claim for
accrued and unpaid alimony.

The parties in that case were divorced

in 1970 and in 1977 the plaintiff made a claim for unpaid alimony.

-5-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The trial court found for the defendant, ruling that the plaintiff
was estopped by her silence from claiming the unpaid alimony.

The

Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

In so doing, the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
Mere silence on the part of plaintifff is not
sufficient to raise an estoppel, and we find nothing
in the record to support the Court's finding that she
had a duty to speak. In the case of French v. Johnson,
16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P.2d 315 (1965), this Court held:
The facts show no representations either explicit
or implicit, by plaintiff to defendant with respect
to discontinuation of payments . . . Mere silence
over a period of time will not raise an estoppel.
(Citations omitted)
The record does not show that plaintiff misled defendant
in any way, nor that defendant changed his position to his
detriment in reliance on any representations or actions on
the part of plaintiff.
In the instant case, it is uncontroverted that the plaintiff
never made any representations to the defendant concerning his
obligations or her intentions*

It is also uncontroverted that she

never asked any third person to relay any representations concerning
those matters.

Apparently, a third person who knew of her stated

intentions relayed these to the defendant.

This does not rise to

the level required by the Utah Supreme Court in Adams.

In that

decision, the court clearly contemplated some affirmative act on the
part of the plaintiff and not mere conversation among friends that
subsequently was relayed, without permission or request, to the
defendant.

Moreover, it is also uncontroverted that the only real

information conveyed to the defendant was that the plaintiff said:
"I'd like to tell the son of a bitch I don't want to see him ever
-6-
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again." (T. 35)

This is not the type of representation upon which

the defendant is entitled to assume that he has no obligation for a
child he has fathered*
In the,case of Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983),
the plaintiff sought judgment against the defendant for nine years
delinquent child support.

The trial court found that the plaintiff

had waived her right tof and was estopped to collect, the accrued
child support, because she had concealed herself and the minor child
from the defendant.

The defendant had also been informed by third

parties that he had no obligation of support.

The Utah Supreme

Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.

In so doing, the court stated as follows:

The common element of the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel is the requirement of action or conduct by the
person against whom the doctrines are asserted. Such action
or conduct is missing in the present case.
The Utah Supreme Court made this statement even in the face
of conduct on the part of the plaintiff in concealing herself and
the minor child from the defendant.

The plaintiff claimed that her

concealment was a result of her fear of the defendant.

The Supreme

Court found that this concealment and the plaintiff's inaction in
seeking the unpaid support ". . .does not unequivocally evince an
intent to waive her right to the accrued child support."
precisely the situation in the present case.

This is

The plaintiff's

statement to a third party, gratuitously relayed to the defendant,

-7-
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that she did not want to see the defendant/ does not unequivocally
evince an intent to waive her right to support.
Even in his self-serving testimony, the defendant
acknowledges that at the time the plaintiff told him she was
pregnant in March 1976, he was aware he could have been the father
of the child.

He subsequently stipulated to a finding of paternity

without a trial on that issue.

He also testified that he knew from

third persons that the plaintiff had given birth to the child and he
acknowledged that he could have located the plaintiff and the child
had he attempted to do so.

The defendant cannot be allowed to avoid

a statutorily imposed support obligation merely due to the delay on
the part of the plaintiff in bringing this action.

By her delay,

the plaintiff has been penalized for all of the support rendered by
her from the child's birth in 1976 through 1979 due to the precise
limitation imposed by Section 78-45a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE HOLDING IN BORLAND V.
CHANDLER.
In Borland, supra, as set forth above, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the doctrines of laches and/or equitable estoppel
may be applicable in a statutory action.

However, the discussion in

Borland clearly centers on the potential prejudice to the defendant
at trial due to the plaintiff's delay.

In that case, the defendant

argued that due to the plaintiff's delay, he was unable to contact
witnesses and locate documents material to his defense.
-8-
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The court

found that the defendant had not in fact suffered any prejudice in
being able to conduct his defense at trial.

The holding of the

Supreme Court in Borland clearly deals with Section 78-45a-2. There
was absolutely no discussion concerning the possible application of
laches to Section 78-45a-3.

This is appropriate since the intent

and effect of Section 78-45a-3 is to limit the defendant father's
potential exposure for past due support.

It is clearly designed to

protect the defendant father from prolonged delay on the part of the
plaintiff mother.

To go further as the trial court has done and

deny the plaintiff any recovery whatsoever for any past due support
is to completely ignore the statutory duty imposed by Section
78-45-3:

"Every man shall support his child . . . "

Due to the

protective nature of the limitation in Section 78-45a-3, the
defendant has already been excused from three years of support
obligation for his son.

To uphold the trial court's ruling and deny

any obligation on the part of the defendant for past due support is
to ignore the legislative intent in enacting Section 78-45a-3. This
was not the intent of the Utah Supreme Court in Borland where the
issue was clearly one of prejudice to the defendant at trial. No
prejudice at trial in the instant case has been asserted nor could
it be.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff believes the
trial court erred in setting aside the judgment previously entered.
The plaintiff respectfully urges this court to reverse the decision
of the trial court and reinstate the judgment in her favor.
-9-
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

fS*

day of

^TL U-^

1988.
THOMAS N. ARNETT, Jr.

—1UPW^5

LU-JI,

Thomas N. A r n e t t , J r S
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f arid
Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
:ss.
)

Kristine Wimmer, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Thomas N. Arnett,
Jr., attorney for plaintiff/appellant, Vickie Burrow, herein, that
she served the attached Brief of Appellant upon the following
parties by placing four true and correct copies thereof in an
envelope addressed to:
Jerome H. Mooney
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
day

of

J\JJJ^

1988.

[Vi^a^w^
day of

Uj'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me personally this
~-JuL^
, 1988.

Notary Public
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JEROME H. MOONEY #2303
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

oooOooo
VICKIE BURROW,

:
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs •

:
:
:
:
:

MARK VRONTIKIS,
Defendant*

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No.

C83-3916

JUDGE: J- Dennis Frederick

oooOooo---

This
Honorable
1987,
the

matter came on regularly for hearing

before

J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, this 7th day of

on remand from the Court of Appeals for

the

December,

consideration

application of laches and estoppel to Plaintiff's claim

of
for

support for the period prior to the commencement of the action in
this

matter;

attorney,

Plaintiff

Thomas

No

appearing in

Arnett, Jr., and

person

and

Defendant

through
appearing

person

and through his attorney, Jerome H. Mooney.

having

reviewed the file in this matter and taken testimony
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her

The

in

Court

enters its Findinas of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:

now

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court notes that in the original trial in

this

matter conducted on the 13th day of August, 1984, that the
expressed its concern with the inordinate delay of the
in

making

Court

Plaintiff

her claim in this matter and for the impact

of

that

1976

when

delay on the Defendant.
2.
the

That said delay extended from March of

parties

met and discussed the condition

of

the

Plaintiff

until the Plaintiff filed the instant action in May of 1983 which
was

prompted

by

support requirements

from

her

then

current

husband due to a then recent separation.
3.

That at the time of the original hearing this Court

was bound by the Utah Supreme Court case of Zito v. Butler, which
prohibited the application of laches in paternity actions.

This

case has now been overruled by the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Borland v. Chandler, which served as a basis for the
and

remand

in

instructions

the instant case by the Court

to

of

reversal

Appeals

the application of laches and estoppel

with

to

the

Plaintiff's claim.
4.
unreasonable
seven

years.

silence.
parties

Plaintiff
delay

in

the instant action

in making claim.

Delaying

engaged

just

made statements to a mutual friend

mer-3

of

which statements-she knew or should have known would

communicated

to

the

Defendant

and

which

an

said . cisi.Tr for

This delay additionally was Tore than

Plaintiff

in

were,
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in

the
be

fact,

communicated to the Defendant indicating that she wanted

nothing

further to do with the Defendant and the Defendant was to have no
contact with her or the minor child.
5.

That

representations
Defendant's

the

which

were

reliance

was

Defendant
relayed
not

relied
to

him

upon
and

unreasonable

these

that
under

the
the

circumstances.
6.

That during the period of time after 1976 and prior

to 1983, the Defendant entered into a marriage and incurred debts
and obligations of his own.
7.

The failure of the Defendant to pay support for the

minor child in this matter during the period of 1976 through 1983
is a result of the actions and inducements of the Plaintiff.
enforce

the

obligation for this period

against

the

To

Defendant

would create an injustice.
8.

The obligation represented by the judgment in

amount of $7,200.00 for the period, prior to May, 1983, should
barred

by

the equitable doctrines of

laches

and/or

the
be

equitable

estoppel.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Equity

should be applied in

actions

to

prevent

injustices including actions for claims in paternity.
2.
the

Claim of the Plaintiff for back support

prior

filing of the instant action should be and is barred by

doctrines of laches and/or equitable estoppel.
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to
the

•#

3c

The judgment previously entered in the

amount

$7,200900 for support prior to May of 1983 is set aside,
day of

J . ^ E N N I S J^EDHRICl
Dls/tsact £©urt/ Judge

Approved as to form:
u

L

THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR
Attorney for Plaintiflf

ATTEST

H^IXONHIVOIEY
Clerk

°epucy Clerk"

DJJVRONT
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of

J/:-ri . u

JEROME H. MOONEY #2303
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for the Defendant
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-5635
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
VICKIE BURROW,

:

ORDER
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

MARK VRONTIKIS,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:

Civil No.

C83-3916

JUDGE: J. Dennis Frederick

oooOooo
.The above-entitled action came on regularly for hearing
on the 7th day of December, 1987.
and

Plaintiff appearing in

through her attorney, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.,

'appearing

and

in person and through his attorney, Jerome H.

person

Defendant
Mooney.

The Court having heard the testimony of the parties, reviewed the
file

in the instant matter and heretofore made and

entered

its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; now, therefore Orders as
follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

That portion of the original judgment outlined

Paragraph 6 in the amount of $7,200.00 is set aside.

The balance

of the previous judgment remains in full force and effect.

DATED this i^K^day of

Mk/

, 19 8/

rS/FREDERICI
ct^Ccuirt' Judge
/

Approved as to form:

ATTEST
H.DWONHiNQLEY

L.Q-.

UgM/^c-5
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR
Attorney for Plaint

//
By

Clark

n
Deputy CfcrK

DJJVRONT
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CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-45a-l.
78-45.1 >.

78-45a-3.
78-45a-4.
78-45a-5.
78-45a-6.
78-45a-7.
78-45a-8.

Obligations of the father.
Enforcement.
Limitation on recovery from the
father.
Limitations on recovery from father's estate.
Remedies.
Time of trial.
Authority for blood tests.
Selection of experts.

Section
78-45a-9.
78-45a-10.
78-45a-ll.
78-45a-12.
78-45a-13.
78-45a-14.
78-45a-15.
78-45a-16.
78-45a-17.

Compensation of expert witnesses.
Effect of test results.
Judgment.
Security.
Settlement agreements.
Venue.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Short title.
Operation of act.

78-45a-l. Obligations of the father.
The father of a child which is or may be born out of wedlock is liable to the
same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock, whether or not the child
is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses of the
child. A child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by
a man other than her husband.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1.
Cross-References. — Public support of children, Chapter 45b of this title.

Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
§ 78-45-1 et seq.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

647
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78-45a-2

JUDICIAL CODE
. NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action to establish paternity.
—Attorney fees.
—Statute of limitations.
Tolling.
Custody rights.
—Acknowledgment of paternity.
Right to trial by jury.
Action to establish paternity.
— Attorney fees.
This act makes no provision for awarding attorney fees to the mother in an action to eatahUH\\ putarnily. Zito v. Butler, 584 R2d 868
(Utah 1978).
—Statute of limitations.
Tolling.
Any statute limiting the time within which a
paternity action must be commenced under the
Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during the period of
the child's minority. Szarak v. Sandoval, 636
P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981).
Custody rights.
—Acknowledgment of paternity.
Father who publicly acknowledged his pater-

nity had right to custody of his illegitimate
child, second only to mother's right, so that it
was improper for juvenile court to dismiss petition for custody and thereby terminate father's
parental right without hearing to determine
whether he was fit and proper person. State ex
rel. Baby Girl M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d
1013, 45 A.L.R.3d 206 (1970).
Right to trial by jury.
Since there is no inherent constitutional
right to a trial by jury in paternity proceedings
in this state and the Legislature has not provided for such a right by statute, the defendant, a putative father, had no right to a trial
by jury. Hyatt v. Hill, 714 P.2d 299 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v„ Mitchell:
Indigent Paternity Defendants' Right to Counsel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 933.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 68.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 18.
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of puta-

78-45a-2.

tive father's promise to support or provide for
illegitimate child, 20 A.L.R.3d 500.
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
A.L.R.4th 565.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «*=»
21.

Enforcement.

Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, or the
public authority chargeable by law with the support of the child. If paternity
has been determined or has been acknowledged according to the laws of this
state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same or other proceedings
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority which have furnished
or may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses, and
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
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History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provisions by Department of Social Services,
§ 55-15a-24.
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties

78-45a-2

of Department of Social Services in collecting
child support, § 55-15c-4.
Public support of children, Chapter 45b of
this title.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Estoppel and laches.
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Right to counsel.
—Indigent prisoners.
——Blood tests.
Discretion of court.
Standard of proof.
— -Preponderance of evidence.
Estoppel and laches.
Under appropriate circumstances, laches
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v„
Chandler, No. 19066 (Utah Sup. Ct. filed Feb.
4, 1987).
A paternity action brought six years after
the birth of the child was not barred by laches,
where defendant made no factual showing to
support his argument that he was prejudiced
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, No. 19066
(Utah Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 4, 1987).
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Where child was conceived while mother was
married to her first husband and born while
she was married to her second husband, the
child was legitimate whichever husband was
the father, and testimony by mother that disputed second husband's fatherhood and supported first husband's fatherhood would not
illegitimize the child and was properly admissible in paternity action against first husband.
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982).
Right to counseL
—Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
While due process does not require Utah to

appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be
some complicated paternity suits in which the
risks of error would be high enough that the
presumption against the right to appointed
counsel would be overcome; given the availability and quality of the blood tests, there is
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Discretion of court.
Due process of law does not require that all
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity
actions must always be appointed counsel;
whether due process requires the appointment
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discretion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d
1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.
The applicable standard of proof where paternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note,
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Stepparents—The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 74 et seq.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 32 et seq.

A.L.R. — Death of putative father as precluding action for determination of paternity
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188.
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bastardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685.
Key NumberSo — Illegitimate children «=»
30 et seq.
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78-45a-3.

Limitation on recovery from the father.

The father's liability for past education and necessary support are limited to
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3.
Cross-References. — Limitation of action

for support or maintenance of dependent children, § 78-12-22,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statute of limitations.

for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of
child support is still limited by this section.
i
o i
i coc n OJ moo /TT*. U
c
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
IQQI>

M?U f11^'
x * i. i- •*• .. A-M.
While any statute limiting the time within
...
;
* ,
,
which a paternity action must be commenced
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 127.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.

78-45a-4.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=>
35.

Limitations on recovery from father's estate*

The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be payable for dependency under other laws.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act," referred to in this section, means Laws

1965, Chapter 158, which appears as
§§ 78-45a-l to 78-45a-17.
Cross-References. — Civil liability for support, Chapter 45 of this title.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ Vil.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.

78-45a-5.

Key Numbers. —- Illegitimate children <*=>
35.

Remedies.

(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available
for enforcement of duties of support under this act.
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the
state Department of Social Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in
its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to enforce
that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the department,
all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable to this
chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Department of
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78-45a-7

Social Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county
attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that department.
History? L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96,
§ 24.
Meaning of "this act", — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45a-4.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support A c t - The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, referred to in the

last sentence in Subsection (1), appears as
Chapter 31 of Title 77.
Cross-References. — Creation of Departm e n t of Social
Services, § 63-35-3.
General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1.
• General duties of county attorney, § 17-18=1.
jurisdiction of district court,
£ general
§ 78-3-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Jurisdiction.
-Minority of putative father.
District court, and not the juvenile court, has
jurisdiction over action brought under the Uni-

form Act on Paternity, when the putative father is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't
of S o d u l

SerV8

v

Dick

684

p 2d 42

{Utah

1904)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jure 2d. — 10 Am. Jur, 2d Bastards
§ 126 et seq.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 116, 117.

78-45a-6.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <^
69 to 71.

Time of trial.

If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy
of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such delay testimony may
be perpetuated according to the laws of this state.
History; L. 1965, ch. 158, § 6.
Cross-References. -— Depositions before action, Rule 27 U U C P .
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 123.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 101.

78-45a-7,

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=»
55.

Authority for blood tests.

The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf
of any person whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the
action made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order
the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party
refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity
against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests
of justice so require.
651

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

78-45a-8

JUDICIAL CODE

History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7.
Cross-References. — Blood tests to determine parentage, §§ 78-25-18 to 78-25-23.

Unreasonable searches, Utah Const., Art, I,
Sec. 14.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 118.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=»
45.

78-45a-8. Selection of experts.
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as examiners of blood types
who shall be appointed by the court. The experts shall be called by the court
as witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any party or person at whose suggestion the tests have
been ordered may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood
types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which
may be offered in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts
shall be determined by the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8.
Cross-Ueferences. — Blood test examiner
as witness, § 78-25-20.

Court appointment of expert witnesses, Rule
706, U.R.E.

78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses.
The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the court shall be
fixed at a reasonable amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. The
court may order that it be paid by the parties in such proportions and at such
times as it shall prescribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but
not appointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not
be taxed as costs in the action.
History: L. 11)65, ch. 158, 8 9.
Cross-References. — Judgment and costs,
Rule 54, U U C P .
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 138.
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=»
75.

78-45a-10. Effect of test results.
If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by the
evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of
the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted
upon all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the
possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is
within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood
type.
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78-45a-12

History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of blood
test results, § 78-25-21.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Admissibility,
tific evidence; such test results were not admit. _
.
ted as evidence where the party submitting the
- H u m a n leukocyte antigen.
test results failed to establish an adequate
This section does not preclude the admissi. f o u n d a t i o n a t t r i a i f o r t h e i r admissibility. Philbihty of human leukocyfe antigen (HLA) test ,.
, TT. , c . . ~ ,. ~ c • , c
,. . r
, . . .,
. .,
,
lips ex reL Utah State Dep t of Social Servs. v.
results if such test otherwise meets the rele- T r .
C1 _ n OJ 1 0 0 Q ;TT. . 1 f t o m
vant legal standards for the admission of scien- J a c k s o n ' 6 1 5 R 2 d 1 2 2 8 ( U t a h 1 9 8 0 ) COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 107.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93.

78-45a-ll.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=
53.

Judgment.

Judgments under this act may be for periodic payments which may vary in
amounto The court may order payments to be made to the mother or to some
person, corporation, or agency designated to administer them under the supervision of the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 11.
Meaning of "this act". — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45a-4.

Cross-References. — Child support collection, Chapter 45d of this title,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 127.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 111.

78-45a-I2.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=»
67.

Security.

The court may require the alleged father to give bond or other security for
the payment of the judgment.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 12.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 128.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Busturds S 118 et «eq.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <*»
70.
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78-45a-13. Settlement agreements.
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father is binding only when
approved by the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 13.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 98 et seq.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 40 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=»
33.

78-45a-14. Venue.
An action under this act may be brought in the county where the alleged
father is present or has property or in the county where the mother resides.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14.
Meaning of "this act". — See note under
same cutchline following § 78-45a-4.

Cross-References. — Venue, general provisions, Chapter 13 of this title.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards
§ 76.
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 57, 58.

Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children *=»
37.

78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, 8 15.
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of
"(t|his act," referred to in this section, see note
under same catchline following § 78-45a-4.

Cross-References. — Construction of statutes, Chapter 3 of Title 68.

78-45a-16. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Act on Paternity."
History; L. 1965, ch. 158, { 16.
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of

"[tlhis act," referred to in this section, see note
under same catchline following § 78-45a-4.

78-45a-17. Operation of act.
This act applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock as defined in this act
where birth occurs after this act takes effect.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 17.
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of
"[tlhis act," referred to throughout this section,

see note under same catchline following
§ 78-45a-4.
"This act takes effect". The term "this act
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the effective date of Laws 1965, Chapter 158,
i.e., May 11, 1965.
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its response until three weeks after it was due.
With knowledge that the notice was forthcoming and a response was necessary, the
employer's neglect or mistake was not excusable. Cf. Katz v. Pierce, 41 Utah Adv. Rep.
12 (Sept. 12, 1986). The Department's refusal
to consider it was reasonable and rational
under sections 35-4-7 and 35-4-10.
We find the arguments on appeal to be
without merit, and the decision of the Board
of Review is affirmed.
Howe, Justice, concurs in the result.
1. §35-4-7(c)(3)(E); all statutory citations
herein arc to U.C.A., 1953 (1974 ed., Supp.
1986).
2. §35-4-10(i); Utah Department of
Administrative Services v. Public Service
Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608-09 (Utah
1983).
3. Section 35-4-7(c)(3)(E) provides, in
part:
Any employing unit that receives a
notice of the filing of a claim may
protest payment of benefits to former
employees or charges to the employer
if the protest is filed within ten days
after the date the notice is issued.
4. See Kirkwood v. Department of Employment Security, 709 P.2d 1158, (Utah 1985);
Wood v. Department of Employment Security, 680 P.2d 38 (Utah 1984); Thiessens v.
Department of Employment Security, 663
P.2d 72 (Utah 1983).
5. Airkem v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513
P.2d 429 (1973).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Kathy BORLAND and the State of Utah, by
and through Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Raymond CHANDLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 19066
FILED: February 4, 1987
THIRD DISTRICT
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup
ATTORNEYS:
David E. Yocom, Sandy Mooy, David L.
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P r w , Via*

Wilkinson for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Randall Gaither for Defendant and
Appellant.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant Raymond Chandler appeals
from a jury verdict finding him to be the
father of a child of plaintiff Kathy Borland.
The jury also awarded Kathy Borland and the
State Department of Social Services damages
for support of the minor child. Chandler
asserts that the trial court erred in allowing
the child to be exhibited to the jury so that it
might determine whether the child resembled
him. He also argues that the action was
barred by laches. We hold that the action was
not barred by laches, but reverse and remand
because an inadequate foundation was laid
for allowing the jury to see the child in
person.
Beginning in January or February of 1973,
Chandler and Kathy Borland began dating.
They saw each other for several months and
regularly had sexual intercourse. In the late
summer or early fall of 1973, Chandler left
Utah to work on a construction site in Rock
Springs, Wyoming. Borland discovered she
was pregnant in October of 1973. On June 8,
1974, Borland bore the child whose paternity
is at issue here.
This action was begun by Borland and the
Utah State Department of Social Services in
1980. Trial was held in 1983, at which time
Borland testified that she had sexual intercourse with Chandler when he returned to Utah
from Rock Springs, Wyoming, on weekends
during August and September of 1973. She
also testified that she did not have sexual
intercourse with men other than Chandler
from June of 1973 until the birth of the child.
Borland testified that after she informed
Chandler of her pregnancy, he offered at
various times to pay for an abortion, marry
her, support her and the child, and at one
time offered her $100 to tell the State that he
was not the father. Borland also asserted that
Chandler acknowledged his paternity when he
visited her at Christmas in 1974. Borland's
mother testified that Chandler told her that
he had offered to marry Borland. Results of
an HLA test established that Chandler was
not excluded as a possible biological father of
the child.
Chandler testified that although he returned to Utah upon occasion after moving to
Rock Springs, he did not have sexual intercourse with Borland after July of 1973. He
denied having offered to pay for an abortion
or to marry Borland. One witness testifying
on Chandler's behalf stated that he had seen
Borland with a number of other male companions in September and October of 1973,
after Chandler left Utah.
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At the beginning of the trial, Chandler
sought an order prohibiting the child's exhi^
bition. Thfe motion was argued at length. The
State's attorney represented to the court that
the child would be exhibited only while
Borland pointed out specific physical similarities between Chandler and the child. The
court then dismissed Chandler's motion0
During trial9 the child was allowed in the
courtroom for about five minutes during
which time his mother identified him. No
testimony was introduced relating to specific
resemblances between Chandler and the
child. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
returned a verdict against Chandler. This
appeal followed.
Chandler first argues that the child should
not have been exhibited to the jury. He urges
this Court to adopt the rule of Almeida v.
Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, 465 P.2d 564 (1970).
There, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that
the exhibition of a child to establish resemblance was improper and that only expert evidence relating to specific resemblances would
be admissible. Id. at 571. If the Almeida rule
is not adopted, Chandler contends that the
exhibition of the child was nonetheless improper under the standard set forth in State v.
Anderson, 63 Utah 171, 224 P. 442 (1924), in
which this Court approved the trial court's
admission of independent evidence as to
"specific resemblances of the child to the
putative father, and thereafter permitted the
child to be exhibited to the jury as evidence."
63 Utah at 174-75,224 P. at 443.
The rules governing the exhibition of a
child to establish paternity vary widely from
one jurisdiction to another Some prohibit
exhibition altogether, while others allow a
child of any age to be exhibited. See generally
Annot., 55 A.L.RJd 1087 (1974). The
Hawaii Supreme Court's Almeida rule flatly
prohibiting exhibition is based upon that
court's finding, drawn from the current literature, that "the link between parent and child
can be discerned only in ... very specific instances and not by evidence of general resemblance or by a comparison of individual features." 465 P.2d at 569. The Hawaii court
concluded as follows:
The identification of a physical characteristic, whether that characteristic
is in fact hereditary, what other
factors may have helped shape it, and
how the characteristic in question is
linked to a similar characteristic
possessed by the alleged parent are all
questions for experts....
Id. at 570. While the Almeida rule has been
followed in a few states, see, e.g., People in
•re R.D.S., 183 Colo. 89, 514 P.2d 772, 774
(1973); cf. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 389
Mass. 308, 450 N.E.2d 167 (1983), it has not
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been widely accepted. See State v. Mesquita,
17 Ariz. App. 151, 496 P.2d 141, 143 (1972);
Glascock v. Anderson, 83 N.M. 725, 497
P.2d 727, 728-29 (1972). Although the scientific data currently available provides support
for the ruling in Almeida, we are not persuaded that this evidence is sufficiently unanimous to justify a departure from the Anderson standard. Cfe State v. Long, 721 P,2d 483
(Utah 1986). In our view, the relatively cautious approach of Anderson to child exhibition strikes a sound middle ground between
prohibiting exhibition of a child altogether
and allowing exhibition regardless of age or
other indicia of reliability, and the Anderson
standard provides sufficient safeguards to
protect against gross speculation on the part
of the jury.
The issue, then, is whether the trial court
properly allowed the child to be exhibited to
the jury under Anderson. We conclude that it
did not. There is no indication in the record
that the trial court found that the child had
the necessary "settled features." State v.
Anderson, 63 Utah at 174, 224 P. at 443.
More critically, no evidence regarding specific
resemblances between Chandler and the child
was introduced prior to the child's exhibition
or even while the child was in front of the
jury. Id. Under these circumstances, the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing exhibition of the child. Aside from this resemblance evidence, the case turned solely upon the
credibility of Borland, Chandler, and their
respective witnesses. Because of the paucity
of other evidence, we cannot predict how the
jury would have decided the matter absent
this error. Therefore, the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Chandler next argues that a new trial
would be improper because the paternity
action, instituted seven years after the child's
birth, is barred by laches. He asserts that the
State's failure to prosecute the action in a
more timely fashion was prejudicial because
the lapse of time has prevented him from
gathering and producing documents and
witnesses essential to his defense. The State
and Borland, relying upon Zito v. Butler, 584
P.2d 868 (Utah 1978), argue that laches has
no application to an action created by
statute. While we conclude that laches may
apply to a statutory action, the facts in the
present case are not sufficient to invoke it.
The principle relied upon by the plaintiffs
here has its roots in the common law distinction between law and equity. At common
law, an equitable defense could not be raised
to a legal action, and because a statutory
action was legal in nature, equitable defenses
would not apply. See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity
§154 (1966). This seems to be the theory
behind Zito, a per curiam opinion. However,
Utah long ago abolished any formal distincDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

Machine-generated
mayCode#Co's
contain errors.Annotation Service.
For enmnlete Utah Code
Annotations,OCR,
consult

16

Codc*Co
Provo, Vitk

51 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

tion between law and equity. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 2. It is well established that equitable
defenses may be applied in actions at law and
that principles of equity apply wherever
necessary to prevent injustice. Hilton v.
Sloan, 37 Utah 359, 374-75, 108 P. 689, 69495 (1910); see generally Marlowe Investment
Corp. v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d
1402 (1971); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545
P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976). Therefore, it is clear
that under appropriate circumstances, laches
may bar an action for paternity. Even the
majority opinion in Nielsen ex rel. Department of Social Services v. Hansen, 564 P.2d
1113, 1114 (Utah 1977), cited by Zito, recognizes in dictum that laches might apply in a
paternity action. Therefore, we conclude that
to the extent that Zito stands for the proposition that an equitable defense is not available, it is an incorrect statement of the law
and is overruled. *
To successfully assert a laches defense, a
defendant must establish both that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an
action and that the defendant was prejudiced
by that delay. Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). In this
case, Chandler asserts that because of the
time lapse, he was unable to contact witnesses
material to his defense and was unable to
locate time cards which would have established that he did not travel from Rock Springs
to Salt Lake City every weekend. Argument
alone is insufficient to persuade us that
Chandler was prejudiced, and he had made
no factual showing to support the argument.
Chandler did not establish that he attempted
and was unable to contact witnesses. Moreover, he had access to company records prior
to trial, and his supervisor testified on his
behalf at trial. There is nothing to indicate
that the testimony equivalent to the evidence
established by the time cards could not have
come in through the supervisor. In addition,
Chandler conceded that he returned to Utah
upon occasion in the fall of 1983; therefore,
the introduction of time cards to show that
he did not return every weekend would not
have materially assisted in his defense. Under
the circumstances, no prejudice is apparent
and further prosecution is not barred by
laches. See Doe v. Roe, 705 P.2d 535, 541
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1985).
Reversed and remanded.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
, Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result.
!
. Zito's analysis of the legal principles
applicable to the time within which a

paternity action must be instituted is weak. A
better reasoned and more recent statement of
the law may be found in Szarak v. Sandoval,
636 P.2d 1082, 1084-85 (Utah 1981).
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HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff brought this quiet title action to
settle a dispute over real property located in
Hurricane, Utah.
I
A trial was had in this case on February 1,
2, and 3, 1983, before an advisory jury. The
case was submitted on special interrogatories
which the jury returned in favor of plaintiff.
The trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law which generally conformed to the pleadings and incorporated the
substance of the jury's answers to the special
interrogatories.. Those findings provided, in
pertinent part:
1. That the Plaintiff Woodruff
Ashton and the Defendant Wilford
Ashton are brothers, and the Defendant Virginia M. Ashton is the wife
, of the Defendant Wilford Ashton ....
2o That the Plaintiff and the Defendant Wilford Ashton had a brother
known under the name and style of
Frank Ashton, which brother is now
deceased, having passed away some
fourteen years prior hereto.
3. That prior to the death of said
Frank Ashton he was the owner of
the following described real property
and water rights located in and or
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